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FEDERAL COURTS - REMOVAL - EXTENT TO WHICH THE
NORRIS-LAGUARDIA ACT, SECTION 4, CONTROLS
FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER LABOR DISPUTES
Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, InternationalAssociation
of Machinists, 390 U.S. 557 (1968).

Six years ago Mr. Justice Stewart in an opinion dealing with a
suit for damages for breach of a collective bargaining agreement,'
noted in a concluding footnote a number of questions which the
Court had specifically not passed on in the case.' He noted, for
example, that the Court had not reached the question of whether
the prohibition against injunctions contained in section 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Ac 3 might apply to a state court's attempt to enjoin a labor dispute;4 nor had they reached the question of whether
I Charles Dowd

Box v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
2 Mr. Justice Stewart noted that the Court had not decided:
...whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act might be applicable in a state court
for violation of a contract made by a labor organization; and whether there
might be impediments to the free removal to a federal court of such a suit.
The relation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to state courts applying federal
labor law has never been decided by this Court. For that matter, we have
not yet ruled on the effect of Norris-LaGuardia upon the jurisdiction of the
federal courts in this area. And quite obviously we have not yet considered
the various problems concerning removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Id. at 514
n.8.
3 Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides in pertinent part:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or
growing out of a labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such disputes as these terms are herein defined from
doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment...
(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud
or violence the acts heretofore specified, regardless of any such undertaking
or promise as is described in section 3 of this Act . . . 29 U.S.C. § 104
(1964).
4
At the time of the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and for many years
thereafter, it was felt that the Act's prohibitions were applicable to federal courts only.
F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE3 LABOR INJUNCTION 215 (1930); Witte, The
Federal Anti-Injunction Act, 16 MINN. L. REv. 638, 657 (1932). This conclusion
readily followed from the very dear language of the Act, limiting jurisdiction to federal courts. 29 U.S.C. § 113(d) (1964). In recent years, however, the argument has
been frequently made that section 4 is also applicable to the states. See note 43,
text accompanying note 41 & note 44 infra. See also Isaacson, The Grand Equation:
Labor Arbitration and the No-Strike Clause, 48 A.B.A.J. 914, 919 (1962); Loeb, Accommodation of the Norris-LaGuardiaAct to other Federal Statutes, 11 LAB. L.J. 473,
491 (1960); Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over Labor
Relations: 11, 59 COLuM. L. REv. 269, 280 (1959). The argument that this prohibition against injunctions in peaceful disputes applies to the states as well derives
its impetus from section 301 of the later Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-
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that prohibition, which by its terms was applicable to federal
courts, was still valid after subsequent legislation; 5 and finally, the
Court was not called upon to respond to the question of whether
removal to a federal court might be permissible where a state court
had enjoined a labor dispute. In the 5 years which have transpired
since Mr. Justice Stewart wrote his opinion, only one of the questions he posed remains unanswered - the direct applicability of
section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to state courts - and that
question has probably been rendered somewhat moot by the recent
Supreme Court decision in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, InternationalAssociation of Machinists.6
In Sinclair Refining v. Atkinson,7 which involved a suit for injunctive relief after nine work stoppages, the Court held that the
situation was governed by section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
that section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Acte had not repealed the prohibition against the issuance of injunctions by federal courts in
peaceful labor disputes, and that a federal court would be barred
from issuing injunctive relief in such a dispute. In Avco the Court
held that an action initiated by an employer in a Tennessee state
court seeking to enjoin? a strike in violation of the union's "noHartley Act). 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964) [hereinafter cited as LMRA § 301), and the
cases interpreting that section. See text accompanying notes 29-41 infra. Thus respondent in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, IAM, 390 U.S. 557 (1968), made
four arguments why section 4 should be applicable to the states. See note 39 infra.
5 The subsequent legislation which was thought to have some impact on section
4 of Norris-LaGuardia was LMRA § 301, referred to in note 4 supra. Since the congressional purposes of the two statutes were so disparate, see notes 8, 28, 39, and text
accompanying note 26 infra, it was thought that LMRA § 301, coming later, would
have some bearing on the continued validity of section 4. This, in fact, was the issue
of Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962), which held that section 4 was
not repealed by the later statute and that federal courts were still barred from issuing
injunctions in labor disputes coming within the terms of section 4 of Norris-Laguardia.
6390 U.S. 557 (1968). For a study of the impact of these answers and of Avco
on the labor-management balance of power, see Note, Reaction to the Wildcat Strike
The Employer's Dilemma, 20 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 423 (1969) (this issue).
7 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
829 U.S.C. § 185 (1964). The basis of the decision in Sinclairrested in large part
on two arguments: That Congress had specifically repealed another section of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act in the LMRA while leaving section 4 intact. See S. 1126, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), 93 CoNG. REC. 5060 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft); and
that the bill as passed by the House had specifically exempted the application of section 4 in suits for breach of a collective bargaining agreement, H.R. 3020, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1947). That this provision was deleted in the Conference Committee was
irrelevant to the Court's conclusion that LMERA section 301 was not to be interpreted
as repealing section 4. See generally, NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 (1948).
9 The employer also asked for general relief in the form of damages. See note 12
infra.
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strike" pledge in the collective bargaining agreement, was properly
removable to a federal court in light of the federal court's subject
matter jurisdiction under LMRA section 301.
The suit for injunctive relief in Avco came about as a result of
three walkouts by union members after the employer's reprimand
of an employee. As Avco saw the matter, the dispute was subject
to the grievance procedure and that, in any case, the no-strike
clause prohibited the union members' retaliation. After Avco had
obtained an ex parte injunction in the state court, the union removed
the case to the federal district court, founding its jurisdictional
basis on LMRA section 301 (a) ."' Once the case had been removed,
the union sought to have the action dismissed and the injunction
dissolved on the ground that the issuance of an injunction by a
federal court was barred by section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
The employer, meanwhile, sought remand to the state court on the
ground that the claim was founded upon state contract law."
The
district court denied both the employer's motion to remand and the
union's motion to dismiss, but did dissolve the injunction.' 2 The
10 The

LMRA section 301(a) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined
in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought
in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties,
without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the
citizenship of the parties. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (a) (1964).
11 The contention that state contract law governed was very weak in light of the
fact that four years earlier the Court had held that a collective bargaining agreement
is a "federal contract," to which jurisdiction attaches automatically. LAM v. Central
Airlines, 372 U.S. 682, 692 (1963).
12The district courts retain jurisdiction, even though the injunction is dissolved,
and therefore the material part of the case is decided, for the same reason that the
district court makes a finding that both injunctive relief as well as general relief are
prayed for; namely, that under FED. R. CIv. P. 54(c), which gives the district court
power to award whatever relief will make a party whole, the court may retain the
action in order to make a total disposition thereof and give, for example, money
damages, if called for. As an example of the court's discretion in this area where the
case is at issue, Barron and Holtzoff state, "a judgment for damages may be entered
in an action for an injunction .... ." 3 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1194, at 39 (Wright ed. 1958). Cf. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 98, at 381 (1963). As a practical matter, however, an award of money
damages or an order compelling arbitration is much less valuable to an employer than
an injunction. Furthermore, the inability of a union to satisfy a money judgment is
quite often the rule. See 51 U. VA. L. REv. 973, 981 n.47 (1965). Yet occasional
arguments are made in behalf of the alternative forms of relief:
The Court acknowledges, of course, that an employer [if injunctive relief is
not available] may obtain an order directing a union to comply with its
contract to arbitrate. Consistently with what we said in Lucas [Teamsters
Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962)], a strike in the face of
such an order would risk a charge of contempt. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkin-
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court of appeals affirmed,' 3 stating that "the remedies available in
State Courts are limited to the remedies available under Federal
law."' 14 Because of a conflict with the Third Circuit,15 the Supreme
Court granted certiorari,' 6 and a unanimous Court1 7 affirmed the
decision of the Sixth Circuit.
The majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Douglas can be
briefly summarized in syllogistic form: (a) The action, involving rights and claims under a collective bargaining agreement, is
an appropriate action under the LMIRA section 301, which bestows

original jurisdiction on district courts in suits involving a violation
son, 370 U.S. 195,227 n.23 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
Besides the possible redress of an order to arbitrate, the court may "enforce or
vacate an arbitration award, grant compensatory damages, render a declaratory judgment, or decree other proper redress." Brief for Respondent at 8, Avco Corp. v. Aero
Lodge No. 735, IAM, 390 U.S. 557 (1968). To the same effect, see listing of these
remedies in Avco, supra at 561.
13 376 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1967).
141d. at 343. This formulation is strikingly similar to the reverse-Erie doctrine
peculiar to Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as FELA], actions brought in a state court, by which state courts are bound to
adhere to federally created substantive rights, regardless of the state's position. See,
e.g., Brown v. Western Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294 (1949) (pleadings must be construed
in favor of the pleader, contra to state rule). See also Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386
(1947); Clearfield Trust v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); Mondou v. New
York, N.H. & H.R.R., 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
' 5 American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, IUE, 338 F.2d 837 (3rd Cit. 1964). In
the American Dredging case, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit based its
decision in favor of the motion to grant remand to the state court on the concept of
a "state-created right" which the employer may utilize to seek an injunction despite
section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Id. at 846. In Avco, the Supreme Court repudiated the notion that a "state-created right" exists to thwart the policy of the national labor law.
3; 389 U.S. 819 (1967).
17The unanimous Court included Brennan, Harlan, and Stewart, JJ., who concurred in the result and felt compelled to note that it was only from the dissolution of
the injunction that the case was appealable, and not from the order denying remand,
citing American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, IUE, 338 F.2d 837, 838 n.2 (1964). By
statute, the dissolution of an injunction is expressly deemed a final order and hence
appealable. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1) (1964). Although an order denying remand
to the state court is not an appealable order because it is not a final order, the propriety of removal from the state court is reviewable on appeal from a final judgment,
since the question goes to the existence of federal jurisdiction. American Fire & Cas.
Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951).
In this connection, the Avco Court noted that the impotence of the district court
to grant an injunction if the action had been brought initially in federal court did
not thereby deprive the district court of the power to dissolve the injunction issued
in a state court. 390 U.S. at 561. The Court cites Swift & Co. v. United States, 276
U.S. 311 (1928), where it was said that the "error, if any, does not go to the jurisdiction of the court. The power to enjoin includes the power to enjoin too much."
Id. at 331. Hence, the congressional contraction of the district courts' equity jurisdiction to issue an injunction in labor disputes does not deprive the district courts of
their original jurisdiction under LMRA section 301.
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of a contract between an employer and the bargaining representative in an industry affecting commerce. 8 (b) Since the action
"arises under" federal law and, therefore, is within the original
jurisdiction prescription of LMRA section 301, the case was properly removable to a district court under the federal removal statute. 9
(c) The right of removal is not nullified by the collateral statute,
section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, since section 4 deprives
20
federal courts of equity jurisdiction and not original jurisdiction.
That is, section 4 merely deprives the federal courts of the authority to issue an injunction in labor disputes; it does not deprive
them of subject matter jurisdiction over labor disputes in general.
Although this most recent decision follows a logical pattern of
development, beginning with the case of Textile Workers v. Lin18

390 U.S. at 559.

19 Id. at 560. Removal is authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1964):
Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded
on a claim of right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the
United States shall be removable without regard to citizenship or residence
of the parties....
20 390 U.S. at 561.
Thus the Court in Avco says, "The nature of the relief
available after jurisdiction attaches is, of course, different from the question whether
there is jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy." Id.
Until the decision in Avco, the question of what was meant by "jurisdiction,"
both in section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and LMRA section 301, was central
to the dispute concerning the continued efficacy of section 4. According to one view,
a court is deprived of jurisdiction if it is unable to provide any means of redress, e.g.,
injunctive relief. This definition is an expedient one and holds that in order to avoid
an "exercise in futility," the case must be dismissed if there is no relief available.
American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, IUE, 338 F.2d 837, 842 (1964). There is at
least one definition of jurisdiction that can be used to good advantage to support
this position: "By jurisdiction we mean power to entertain the suit, consider the merits
and render a binding decision thereon." General Inv. Co. v. New York Cent. R.R.,
271 U.S. 228, 230 (1926).
The more accepted view, and the view confirmed in Avco, is one that takes into
account both subject matter jurisdiction, for purposes of the original jurisdiction requirement of section 301, and equity jurisdiction, for purposes of the remedial prohibition in section 4. Cf. DiGiovanni v. Camden Ins. Ass'n, 296 U.S. 64, 69 (1935).
In short, equity jurisdiction goes to the merits of the case and presents a different
question from whether the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter:
Frequently the term "jurisdiction" is loosely used to mean that under
the facts of the case a party is not entitled to prevail, and thus, so it is argued,
the court lacks power - or "jurisdiction" - to grant the relief sought.
Such usage is incorrect, and leads only to confusion. The jurisdiction of the
federal courts is dependent on the subject matter of the action or the status
of the parties to it; it is not dependent on the merits of the case. 1 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, supra note 12, §21, at 85.
Professor Chaffee, therefore, concluded that "jurisdiction" as used in section 4 of
Norris-LaGuardia refers to equitable jurisdiction, that is, to "right principles of judicial action and not to power." Z. CHAFFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 372
(1950). See Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 8; cf. 6A J. MOORE, FEDERAL
PRAcTicE 5 57-18 [22, at 3104 (2d ed. 1966).
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coln Mills,21 it does not for that reason draw nearer to a final resolution of all the questions posed at the outset; specifically, whether
the prohibition against injunctions in peaceful labor disputes applies
to state courts.
The initial blame for the fact that today there are different
forms of relief available in labor disputes, depending on the forum,
rests with Congress.22 Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
passed in 1932, was framed in jurisdictional terms giving a catalogue of situations generally involving peaceful strikes, in which a
federal court would be barred from issuing an injunction, and, as
some commentators point out,23 was so framed in order to avoid
the head-on conflict with a substantive due process test witnessed
11 years before in Truax v. Corrigan.4 If it seems startling that
Congress should be so apprehensive, it should be recalled that it
was not until 1937 that the Court decided that Congress had the

power to control labor relations under its plenary power to regulate commerce.a5 Although both section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act and section 301 of the LMRA are phrased in jurisdictional
terms, the policies which Congress sought to effect by each enactment are opposite - whereas section 4 was designed to eliminate
the indiscriminate use of the injunctive power by federal judges
during the depression, the object of the Taft-Hartley Act was the
curtailment of the drastic number of work stoppages that occurred
21 353 U.S. 448 (1957). The Lincoln Mills decision set the stage for the increased federal influence in labor law policy. Stressing the peculiarly federal nature of
labor law policy as well as the need for national uniformity in that policy, the Court
rejected a construction of section 301 of LMRA that would make it purely jurisdictional. Instead, in light of the need for a uniform national labor policy, the grant
of jurisdiction in LMRA § 301 was held sufficient to empower the federal courts to
fashion federal remedies to effectuate the national labor policy. In short, the Lincoln
Mills decision, operating under the jurisdictional grant of LMRA section 301, created
a substantive federal common law of labor relations.
22 See the concise summary of the legislative history of the LMRA as well as the
significance of the compromises incorporated in that Act, in Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 205-10 (1962). See also note 8 supra.
23 Note, Accommodation of the Norris-LaGuardiaAct to Other Federal Statutes,
72 HARV. L REV. 354, 366 n.87 (1958); 51 U. VA. L. REV. 973, 976-77 n.22 (1965);
see Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 203 (1962). Cf. F. FRANKFURTER
& N. GREENE, supra note 4, at 220, where the authors point out that the Court in
fact invalidated the state anti-injunction statute because it precluded all manner of
relief, unlike section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which merely neutralizes injunctive relief, and all other forms of relief remain available, as discussed in note 12 supra.
24257 U.S. 312 (1921). See note 23 supra. In Truax the Court held that an
Arizona statute which precluded the employer from all injunctive relief to stop picketing at his place of business deprived him of property without due process of law and
hence was unconstitutional.
25
NLRB v. Jones &Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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after World War II. Thus, section 4 effected a contraction of
federal jurisdiction while the thrust of LMRA section 301 was an
expansion of federal court involvement in labor relations.
Given the expansive Congressional intent behind the jurisdictional grant in LMRA section 301 and the failure of Congress
to provide substantive rules of decision for implementing that
grant of jurisdiction,' 6 several fundamental questions became evident: (1) Did the grant of jurisdiction in LMRA section 301 over
"suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization" 27 repeal sub silentio section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act so as to revest the district courts with jurisdiction to issue an
injunction against a strike in violation of a no-strike clause contained in a labor contract? (2) Could the term jurisdiction possibly mean the same thing in both statutes, so that it is possible to
reconcile the two statutes? (3) Was it possible for the terms
to have different meanings in each statute and still be reconciled?
Such were the difficult questions that Congress, because it had
drafted the two contrary statutes in apparently similar terms, presented to the judiciary.2 8 It has only been in recent years that the
judiciary has responded. As previously noted, the case development began with Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills,2" where the
Court held that in cases arising under LMRA section 301, federal
law is to be applied, not state law; moreover, the federal law is to
be fashioned "from the policy of our national labor law."" ° But
neither section 301 nor the preeminence of federal labor law divests the state courts of jurisdiction over section 301 suits,3 1 since
26 See note 21 supra.

U.S.C. § 135(a) (1964).
28 With respect to the legislative intent behind LMRA section 301, one commentator has remarked:
The dominant Congressional objective behind the enactment of Section
301 of the LMRA appears to have been a relatively simple one, namely, to
eliminate certain technical obstacles to suits for breach of collective bargaining agreements. Such obstacles had been particularly formidable in actions
at law because of the common law requirement that all members of a union
be joined as parties defendant or parties plaintiff and because of the failure
in actions at law to shape the class suit into a device for satisfying or avoiding
restrictive common law requirements. Congress, whose primary purpose
was to facilitate actions against unions, neglected federal-state relationships
as well as the relationship between judicial and administrative competence.
As a result, the congressional effort at simplification has paradoxically increased the complexities surrounding the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. Meltzer, supra note 4, at 269.
29 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
30 Id. at 456 (emphasis added).
31 The investiture by section 301 of original jurisdiction in the federal courts
2729
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section 301 by its terms does not make the district court jurisdiction exclusive.32 Thus, in a suit for breach of a collective bargaining agreement, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the award of a money judgment 3 3 and, on certiorari to the
Supreme Court, the judgment was affirmed. 4 The Court stated
that Congress could not have intended to deprive the states of jurisdiction existing before, or concurrent jurisdiction after, enactment
of LMRA section 301. 35 Soon thereafter, in Teamsters Local 174
v. Lucas Flour Co.,36 the Court reaffirmed the principles of the
Lincoln Mills decision, emphasized the need for uniform federal
law, but continued to recognize the existence of concurrent juris7
diction in state courts over section 301 suits.3
While the Lincoln Mills decision had established the general
direction of labor policy, the decision in Sinclair Refining Co. v.
does not take away the concurrent jurisdiction of the states. Charles Dowd Box Co.
v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962). See also McCarroll v. Los Angeles Dist. Council,
49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958).
3
2 See C. WRIGrr, supra note 12, § 45. "Unless [Congress] has made federal jurisdiction exclusive in terms, the state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the
federal courts." Id. at 147.
33
Courtney v. Charles Dowd Box Co., 341 Mass. 337, 169 NXE.2d 885 (1960).
34
Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
35 Id. at 507-09.
36 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
37 The dimensions of section 301 requires the conclusion that substantive principles of federal labor law must be paramount in the area covered by the
statute. Comprehensiveness is inherent in the process by which the law is
to be formulated under the mandate of Lincoln Mills, requiring issues raised in suits of a kind covered by section 301 to be decided according to the
precepts of federal labor policy.
More important, the subject matter of section 301(a) "is peculiarly one
that calls for uniform law." Id. at 103.
Recognition that there are some situations which call for uniform xegulation on a
national level, and that in these situations the states are powerless to act, is usually
attributed to dictum in Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S.
(12 How.) 299 (1851).
The argument for uniformity in the area of injunction prohibitions is usually bottomed on an appeal to common sense, that is, avoid the patch-work result of allowing the states to formulate their own criteria in issuing labor injunctions, a result
which is said to be contradictory to a viable national labor policy. And, the argument goes, the lesson behind Lincoln Mills and its progeny is that a national labor
policy must be formulated, no matter what the cost to state labor policy. See, e.g.,
Aaron, Strikes in Breach of Collective Agreements: Some Unanswered Questions, 63
COLum. L. REv. 1027, 1036 (1963); Meltzer, supra note 4, at 279-80. A passage
from the respondent's brief is illustrative of the typical argument for uniformity:
Without removal the federal questions presented in §301 actions brought in
state courts will be decided by state courts that may be inhospitable to or
unaware of national labor policy. Federal law will be fashioned without the
sustenance of federal courts and correction of state errors in the federal area
will have to await the necessarily limited attention that this Court can devote to this burgeoning field. Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 10.
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Atkinson38 was to give it its bearings. In Sinclair, the Court held
that LMRA section 301, coming 15 years after the Norris-LaGuardia Act, had not repealed the earlier statute, so that federal
district courts were still bound by the injunction prohibition. Indeed, the language in Sinclair is so strong3 9 that some critics have
suggested that the decision stands for the proposition that section 301 had absorbed section 4 as an integral part of national
40
labor policy.
With the decisions up to and including Avco providing the
incremental units, the judicial structure requires the answer to but
one further question: whether section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, which is cast in terms of Congress' article III power to define
and regulate the jurisdiction of federal courts, forms a substantive
part of the federal scheme regulating labor relations which was
See note 8 supra and note 39 infra.
39 Sinclair decided the basic question of whether section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act was repealed by LMRA section 301. This was in 1962. Since then, the emphasis has come full circle, so that now the inquiry is whether section 4 is to be applied
to the states. 390 U.S. at 560 n.2 .
The question of the direct applicability of section 4 to the states is, however, not
resolved by the Avco decision. It may also be suggested that another question left
unanswered by Avco is whether section 301 might still be said to have repealed section 4, in spite of the strong language in Sinclair against such a notion, in view of
the offhand remark by the concurring justices in Avco that "the scope and continuing validity of Sinclair"will be considered at a later date. 390 U.S. at 562.
Of the two questions left unanswered by the Court in Avco, the more relevant is
the applicability of section 4 to the states. This seems to be a valid choice in light of
the Court's tendency in cases dating from Lincoln Mills through Avco to extend the
sphere of influence of federal labor law. Thus in Avco respondent pressed four arguments for carrying section 4 over to the states: (1) Uniform application of paramount federal law is necessary. (2) The uniformity called for extends to the prohibition against injunctive relief, whether the prohibition be termed substantive, remedial, or procedural. (3) Section 4 has become part of the national labor policy and
can no longer tolerate the anomalous situation whereby claimants can obtain remedies
in state courts not available in federal courts. (4) Since the Court in Sinclair held
that Congress rejected the argument that injunctions are necessary in peaceful strikes,
there is no longer room for the argument that such injunctions are necessary when
a section 301 suit is brought in state court rather than federal court. Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 12-15.
40 Aaron, supra note 37, at 1039. Once integrated into national labor policy, the
next logical step of applying section 4 to the states readily follows:
[The Supreme Court] should now rule that state courts enforcing rights
arising under that section [301] are prohibited from granting injunctions
against strikes allegedly in violation of collective agreements. In doing so
it would not be applying the jurisdictional limitations of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to the state courts; rather it would be applying the federal common law of Section 301. Id.
A slight variation on this theme is: "A strike injunction is not grantable in a §301
action in any court, state or federal, not because the Norris-LaGuardia Act applies to
state courts, but because that Act defines federal policy with respect to the enforcement of federal labor contracts." Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 14-15.
38 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
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enacted under the commerce clause.41 If indeed section 4 does
constitute part of the federal substantive labor law, then it may be
argued that the state courts are bound by the injunction prohibition in the exercise of their concurrent jurisdiction under section
301.

Although section 4 is couched in jurisdictional terms, it clearly
bars a right that is most critical to an employer during times of
work stoppages, and for that reason it now seems to be beyond
argument that the section is substantive in nature. Since a labor
dispute is often won or lost, depending on the success or failure of
the employer's application for a temporary injunction, it is evident
that the existence of the injunctive remedy is inextricably tied to
the substantive rights of the parties.42 Yet, even if it is conceded
that the prohibition against injunctions in labor disputes is a substantive part of the federal labor law, it does not necessarily
follow that state courts in the exercise of their concurrent jurisdiction over labor disputes are bound to apply the federal rule with
respect to injunctions, for Congress has not expressly bound the
state courts to follow the federal rule with respect to injunctions. 43
However, it has been argued that once it is declared that section 4
44
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is substantive rather than procedural,
the rule prohibiting injunctions is incorporated into the substantive
body of federal labor law applicable to the states under the manU. VA. L. REV. 973, 976 n.22 (1965).
Aaron, supra note 37, at 1035. Under one view, section 4 might be considered
procedural, for Taft-Hartley was enacted under the commerce clause, while NorrisLaGuardia, section 4, was enacted under article III. Therefore, it might be argued
that the Norris-LaGuardia prohibition against injunctions is merely procedural and not
substantive federal law.
43
Although under its plenary power over interstate commerce Congress has the
Constitutional authority to bind the state courts to the policy of section 4 and such
policy will be binding on the states under the supremacy clause of Article VI, Congress may not have intended to exhaust its Constitutional authority, thereby allowing
the states to formulate their own policy with respect to injunctions in labor disputes.
Analogies to other areas provide the best illustration of this statement. See, e.g.,
Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (in the area of federal
antitrust law); the McCarran Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1964) (in the area of insurance regulation under the commerce power). Compare Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946), with United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n,
322 U.S. 533 (1944).
44 Even if the prohibition against injunctions contained in section 4 were considered
procedural, it can still be argued that the state courts are bound by the federal procedure, because where the federal procedure forms an integral part of the federal
right which state courts are bound to heed in the exercise of their concurrent jurisdiction, state courts are bound to apply the federal procedure to give meaning to the
federal right. See Brown v. Western Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294 (1949); cases cited
note 14 supra.
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date of Lincoln Mills. 48 Given these technical arguments for and
against the applicability of section 4 to the states, the ultimate resolution of the conflict will depend on competing policy considerations.
In McCarroll v. Los Angeles District Council,46 Chief Justice
Traynor found unpersuasive the argument that state courts should
be bound by the dictates of section 4. He reasoned: (1) The
Norris-LaGuardia Act speaks only of "courts of the United States,"
which the Act defines as those courts "whose jurisdiction has been
or may be conferred or defined or limited by Act of Congress;'"
(2) the legislative history of both acts, 48 Norris-LaGuardia section
4, and LMRA section 301, as well as two unsuccessful attempts to
remove the section 4 prohibition,49 militate against the view that section 4 was intended by Congress to apply to the states.
On the other hand, it is argued with equal fervor that the most
vital aspect of a meaningful national labor law is uniformity."
Where the bargaining representatives are involved in industries affecting commerce the problems are national in scope" and require
one uniform system of regulation. Further, it is anomalous, to say
the least, that the body of national labor law, which is almost wholly
federal law, should have to tolerate the attempts of state courts to
thwart the policy federal courts are forbidden to obstruct. In the
final analysis, Congressional intent, 52 in terms of policies which
Congress expressly or impliedly incorporated into LMRA section
301, must control.
45 Comment, The Norris-LaGuardiaAct and Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act

Problems of Jurisdiction and Removal in the Enforceability of Collectively Bargained No-Strike Agreements, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 489, 501 (1965).
46 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957).
47 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1964).
Mr. Justice Frankfurter once declared that when
Congress provides for enforcement of federal claims in state courts, it must "take the
state courts as it finds them," the implication being, for present purposes, that Congress is powerless to impose the prohibition of section 4 on state courts. Brown v.
Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178, 190 (1944) (concurring opinion).
48 For legislative history of the LMRA with respect to whether or not it sought
to repeal section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, see notes 8 & 22 supra.
49 The two unsuccessful bills were S.2132, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), introduced
by Senator Javits, and H.R. 9059, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), introduced by Congressman Reid. Both were attempts to undo the decision in Sinclair and expressly
provided for the non-application of section 4 in certain circumstances.
56 See note 40 supra.
51 See Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 10, 12-15; cf. the "Cooley doctrine,"
cited in note 37 supra.
52See Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLTJM. L. REV.
489, 527 (1954).
-

1969]

LABOR INJUNCTIONS

Prior to the enactment of the LMRA, section 4 had become
part of the national labor policy. In the case of United States v.
Hutcheson,5 3 the Court invoked the Norris-LaGuardia Act in a
criminal antitrust proceeding against a union to support the proposition that certain union conduct immunized for purposes of the
injunctive remedy should likewise be immunized from the reach
of the antitrust legislation. Thus, upon the enactment of the
LMRA, a House proposal to suspend application of section 4 failed
to pass both Houses, ostensibly because of Congressional fear
that repeal of section 4 would subject labor unions to antitrust actions.5 4 Given that the motivating legislative purpose behind section 301 was to facilitate suits against unions,55 and given the
Supreme Court's interpretation of that section in the Lincoln Mills
and Sinclair decisions, without adverse Congressional response, it
would appear that such an integral part of national labor policy as
section 4 should be applicable in state courts enforcing collective
bargaining agreements.
However, no clear demarcations stand out under the present
state of the law, so that it is not surprising that the Avco Court
would hold that a suit seeking injunctive relief and within the
ambit of LMRA section 301 is properly removable to a federal district court, but that the parties must be content to rest there in vacuo,
since the only appropriate type of relief is not available.5
Unrealistic as it may seem, the next step is for Congress.5
With the Avco decision, the federal courts have now done everything judicially possible short of applying section 4 directly to the
states.55 It appears that the manifest interpretation of the legisla53 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
54
See note 8 supra.
55 For purpose behind LMRA see note 28 supra.
5
6 See note 12 supra.
57 It is beyond dispute that ... resolution of contested issues touching upon sen-

sitive areas of our social and economic life should be made by the electorally based
and therefore responsive political institutions." Wellington & Albert, Statutory Interpretation and the Political Process: A Comment on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YALE

L.J. 1546, 1566 (1966). Whether Congress would in fact clear up the impasse the
cases have presently reached is another question. And, as one writer has suggested,
congressional action may not be desirable and "[t~he risk that such an amendment
would be obtained, if at all, only at the cost of additional and undesirable amendments to either or both statutes is probably too great to justify the effort at the present time." Aaron, supra note 37, at 1030.
58 See text accompanying note 2 supra. It may be of some significance that 24
states have some form of anti-injunction statute. For a comprehensive list, see Comment, 1963 U. ILL. L.J. 495, 497 n.13. As far as state court cases are concerned,
the overwhelming number of state courts hold that section 4 does not reach their

